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application would be an invaluable aid in bringing about relief from punishment
for the criminal act which is the product of mental illness, without destroying our
traditional concept of responsibility for crime.




Motorist Statutes and Federal Jurisdiction
An automobile collision occurs on a state highway. The injured party consults
an attorney concerning the possibility of bringing an action against the negligent
driver, or his principal, or the manufacturer of the car, or all of them.
A tort action being transitory in nature, the attorney may bring the action in
either the federal' or state courts having their situs in the jurisdiction where the
defendant resides. Clearly, however, this might well entail great inconvenience to
the plaintiff or his witnesses and certainly may not bring the action to a "just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination."
In addition, regardless of where the defendant resides, the attorney may
bring the action in the courts of the state wherein the collision occurred. All
forty-eight states and the District of Columbia have enacted motorist statutes
2
which universally provide that simply by driving on the state highways, a non-
resident motorist becomes amenable by operation of law to suit for accidents
caused by his negligent operation of his automobile. Furthermore, these statutes
usually provide for the "implied appointment" of some state official as a lawful
agent or attorney to receive service of process for the non-resident. No
objection to jurisdiction or adjective Due Process may be raised successfully.8
The plaintiff is thus assured of at least three forums which will adjudicate his cause.
If the defendant is sued in a state court and actually is a non-resident, he has
a constitutional and statutory right of removal of the negligence action to the
IJudiciary and Judicial Procedure, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1391 (1948); Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U. S. C. Rules 4 (d) and (f) (1938).
2 Cf. An extensive analysis of all non-resident motorist statutes in Knoop v. Anderson,
71 F. Supp. 832, 836-837 (N. D. Iowa 1937); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed.
1949), § 73 (6); Scott, Jurisdiction Over Non-Resident Motorist, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 563
(1926); 20 Iowa L. Rev. 654 (1935).
8Cf. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 (1927) wherein the Supreme Court decided
that the difference between the "formal and implied appointment" of an agent for service
of process "is not substantial" under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
for the purpose of state jurisdiction; Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160 (1916); Hendrick
v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610 (1915).
United States District Court on the ground of diversity of citizenship., Therefore,
the defendant in this instance has the choice of forums, i.e., between the federal
and state courts in the territorial limits of the state where the action is instituted.
The question remains whether the plaintiff has a similar choice, and this in turn
highlights the question of federal jurisdiction in motor vehicle cases.
Any action may be instituted in the federal courts only if the provisions of
the Judiciary Act of 19481 and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' are observed.
Being statutory courts, the Federal District Courts are completely dependent on
congressional will for their jurisdiction.
7
As a practical matter, the attorney desiring to bring a diversity of citizenship
action in the federal courts has three jurisdictional problems: (1) jurisdiction of
the subject matter, (2) venue, and (3) service of process so as to secure in
personam jurisdiction over the parties.
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
If the case is civil in nature, and the amount in controversy exceeds $3,000,
and the parties are of diverse citizenship, the United States District Courts have
jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action." However, this alone is insuf-
ficient. Attachment of property within the jurisdiction and substituted service of
process is not permitted in the federal courts, in the absence of very stringent
statutory authority.' Except in rare instances,'0 all United States District Court
judgments in diversity of citizenship cases must be in personam.1"
4 Art. III, Cl. 2, U. S. CoNsT.; Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1441-
1450. Also Cf. Cook v. Nelson, 186 Misc. 1081, 62 N. Y. S. 2d 875 (1946).
5Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, 28 U. S. C. § 1 at seq. (1948).
6 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U. S. C. Rule 1 at seq. (1938). Hereinafter,
specific Rules will not be footnoted merely as to the code title.
7Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 9, U. S. CoNsT. Also Cf. The Enabling Act which grants power
to the Supreme Court to prescribe the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Judiciary and
Judicial Procedure, 28 U. S. C. § 2072 (1949), originally the Act of June 19, 1934, c. 651,
§§ 1-2 (48 Stat. 1064), 28 U. S. C. 723 (b) and (c) (1934).8 Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1948); Mississippi
Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U. S. 438, 440 (1945).
OCf. Comments of William D. Mitchell, former Attorney General and Chairman of
the Advisory Committee, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Proceedings of the Institute
at Cleveland, 1938, published by the A. B. A., Chicago, pp. 381-382. Rule 71A (d) (3)
(ii), adopted in 1951, allows service by publication in eminent domain actions for con-
demnation of property; 2 Moores Federal Practice § 4.32 (2d ed. 1948). Concerning Rule
64, authorizing attachment, garnishment, and other similar provisional remedies when avail-
able by local law, see Manella, Attachment in Federal Courts-When Personal Service Is
Not Necessary, 13 So. Calif. L. Rev. 361 (1940); 3 Fed. Rules Service 987 (2d ed. 1948);
Hart, Attachment Without Personal Service of Summons, 34 Corn. L. Q. 103 (1948); 11
Fed. Rules Service 804 (2d ed. 1948); 3 Barron & Holtzoff, Fed. Prac. & Proc., § 1423
(1950); 14 Cyc. Fed. Proc., (3d ed. 1952) § 71.04.
10 Cf. Response of Major Edgar B. Tolman, member of the Supreme Court Advisory
Committee, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Proceedings of the Institute in Washington
and Symposium at New York City, 1938, published by the A. B. A., Chicago, p. 114 (1939);
Note of Advisory Committee to Subdivision (e), Federal Court Rules Annotated, Bobbs &
Merrill (2d ed. 1952), p. 283; 2 Barron & Holtzogi, note 9 supra at § 183, pp. 333-336; 2
Moores Federal Practice, note 9 supra at §§ 4.32-4.41, pp. 1002-1029.
"Big Vein Coal Co. v. Read, 229 U. S. 31 (1913). Of course, where an action is
commenced in a state court by attachment or garnishment, such action may be removed to
Venue
The question of venue in motor vehicle cases was considered by the United
States Supreme Court in Olberding v. Illinois Central R. Co.1 2 There, the collision
occurred in Kentucky. The plaintiff railroad company, an Illinois corporation,
instituted an action in the United States District Court for the Western District
of Kentucky against Olberding, a citizen of Indiana. It is important to emphasize
that the collision took place in one state, the plaintiff was domiciled in another state
and the defendant was a resident of still a third state. Service of process was
made on the Secretary of State in Frankfort, Kentucky, pursuant to an appropriate
"Hess v. Pawloski statute." The defendant's motion to quash the return of service
of summons and to dismiss the action under Rule 12 (b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure was finally sustained by the United States Supreme Court solely
on the ground of improper venue.
Congress, in conferring jurisdiction on the district courts in cases based solely
on diversity of citizenship, has been explicit to confine such suits to "the
judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside." 28 U. S. C.
§ 1391 (a).13
The venue qualification placed upon the power of the federal courts to
adjudicate a cause is but a limitation for the convenience of the litigants, and as
such, may be waived by them. 4 In the Olberding case, the defendant did not
actually consent to waiver of federal venue. His consent was attributed to an
implied agreement to be sued in the federal courts of Kentucky because he negli-
gently drove his automobile on the state highways so as to come within the perview
of the motorist statute.15
Mr. Justice Frankfurter made the interesting distinction to the effect that by
using the state highways, the non-resident impliedly consents to be sued in the
state court and to the appointment of the Secretary of State as his lawful agent
to receive service of process. The non-resident, however, does not also impliedly
consent to waive his federal venue rights. Such an extention of the Hess v. Paw-
loski doctrine "is surely to move in the world of Alice in Wonderland."',-
Nevertheless, the decision in the Olberding case did not preclude a claim
being instituted in the federal courts in a proper motor vehicle case. Two and
perhaps three situations still exist under which original federal jurisdiction may be
invoked by the plaintiff. First, as has been observed, the tort action being transi-
tory, a claim may be initiated in the federal district wherein the defendant resides,
is incorporated, or carries on business. All of the requirements of jurisdiction,
the federal court, even though there has been no personal service. Judiciary and Judicial
Procedure, 28 U. S. C. § 1450 (1948); Clark v. Wells, 203 U. S. 164 (1906); 2 Moores
Federal Practice, note 9 supra at 288.
12346 U. S. 338 (1953).
13 Id. at 340.
14Id.
'1 Cf. Non-resident motorist provisions of the Kentucky Code, note 11 supra at 340.
16 Note 11 supra at 341.
venue and service of process thereby will be met.17 Second, where states, such as
New Jersey, provide for the mandatory appointment of the Secretary of State to
receive service of process, or where such appointment actually has been made by
the non-resident motorist, the venue requirements of the federal courts will be
satisfied as so specifically indicated in the Olberding case,-8 and the federal courts
will have complete jurisdiction though neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants
reside or carry on business in that state. Third, if the collision occurs in a state
wherein all of the plaintiffs reside, a claim may be brought in the United States
District Court within that state,'0 even though the defendant be a non-resident.
The jurisdiction and venue requirements of the federal courts pose no problem in
this latter instance. The validity of service of process, however, has been placed
in doubt by recent, lower federal court decisions due to an apparent conflict be-
tween Rules 4 (d) (7)20 and 4 (f) 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Service of Process
Subject-matter jurisdiction and venue of the federal courts are governed by
the Judiciary Act of 1948 while service of process is controlled by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, primarily Rules 4 and 4522 in motor vehicle cases. Also
closely intertwined is the ever present necessity to bring in an additional party to
a counterclaim, Rule 13 (h), to add a third-party defendant, Rule 14, and to join
and indispensable party without whom joinder of the existing action must be
dismissed, Rule 19.
17 Note I supra.
Is Note 11 supra at 341. Also Cf. Kane v. New Jersey, note 3 supra, where mandatory
appointment annually and formally was required by a motorist statute. In this event, the
rationale of Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem, 308 U. S. 165 (1939) would control by analogy to
a state's right to demand appointment when granting the privilege of incorporation. Actual
appointment was made and upheld as the basis of federal jurisdiction in Williams v. James
et al., 34 F. Supp. 61 (W. D. La. 1940) and Cheshire et ux. v. Car & General Ins. Corp. et
al., 4 F. R. D. 353 (W. D. La. 1945). It would also appear that under 49 U. S. C. § 321 (c)
(1949) which requires designation of a process agent by interstate motor carriers, consti-
tutes another exception to the Olherding decision,
10 In Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, note 8 supra, the Supreme Court held
under Rule 4 (f) that service of process may be extended to include service from one fed-
eral district to another district in the same state without more than "slightly" impairing the
substantive rights of the defendant.
20 (d) SUMMONS: PERSONAL SERVICE. (7) Upon a defendant of any class referred to
in paragraph (1) or (3) of this subdivision of this rule, it is sufficient if the summons and
complaint are served in the manner prescribed by any statute of the United States or in any
manner prescribed by the law of the state in which the service is made for the service of
summons or other like process upon any such defendant in an action brought in the courts
of general jurisdiction of that state. (Italics added.)
21 (t) TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF EFFECTIVE SERVICE. All process other than a subpoena
may be served anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is
held and, when a statute of the United States so provides, beyond the territorial limits of that
state. A subpoena may be served within the territorial limits provided in Rule 45. Also
Cf. Note of Advisory Committee to Subdivision (f), Federal Court Rules Annotated, note 10
supra at pp. 223-224.
22 Rule 45 (e) (1) . . . A subpoena requiring the attendance of a witness at a hear-
ing or trial may be served at any place within the district, or at any place without the
district that is within 100 miles of the place of the hearing or trial specified in the
subpoena....
To add to the complexity of this consideration, but in an effort to resolve
existing confusion, the Advisory Committee to the Supreme Court has recently
submitted a sweeping preliminary draft23 of proposed amendments to the Rules
of Civil Procedure. The import of the proposed amendments to Rules 4 (e) and
4 (f) will be discussed by way of conclusion after the present state of the law is
reviewed.
The United States Supreme Court decided the Olberding case solely on the
ground of improper venue. The Court cited the case of McCoy v. Siler24 in its
opinion, but made no reference to the concurring observations of Judge Maris on
the matter of service of process.
... For extraterritorial service in the federal courts is regulated by Federal Civil
Procedure rule 4 (f), 28 U. S.C. That rule restricts the service of process to
the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held unless a
statute of the United States authorizes service beyond those limits. In this re-
spect the rule is a limitation upon the provisions of Federal Civil Procedure
rule 4 (d) (7) which authorizes service in the manner prescribed by state law.
Since there is no federal statute authorizing extraterritorial service in a diversity
case such as this one, rule 4 (f) operated to prohibit service upon the de-
fendants. . . . The district court, therefore, did not, in my opinion, acquire
jurisdiction of the person of the defendant.
25
A recent District Court decision, Giffen v. Ensign,26 serves to emphasize the
importance of Judge Mars' comments concerning the validity of service of process
on a non-resident motorist. In the Giffen case, the collision occurred on the high-
way in the Middle Federal District of Pennsylvania wherein the plaintiffs, husband
and wife, resided. The complaint named four defendants among whom was
Ensign, an Indiana resident who was not carrying on business in Pennsylvania.
Again, it is important to reiterate that the collision took place in the state wherein
all of the plaintiffs resided. Since only two states were involved, no venue question
was raised as in the Olberding case.
A claim was brought in the United States District Court and the summons
and complaint were served pursuant to Rule 2079 of the Pennsylvania Rules of
Civil Procedure. A true and attested copy of process was sent by registered mail
to the Secretary of the Commonwealth and to all of the defendants. Inter alia,
the defendants entered a motion to quash the return of service on the ground
that Rule 4 (f) is a limitation upon the provisions of Rule 4 (d) (7) which
authorizes service in any manner prescribed by state law. The District Court held:
Venue being admitted, it is our conclusion that under the provisions of Rule
4 (d) (7) and the Pennsylvania Procedural Rule 2079 proper service was had
on all defendants in this case and the court has jurisdiction.27
It was not contended, nor indeed could it be, that the Pennsylvania motorist
23 Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the
United States District Courts, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington (1954).
24205 F. 2d 498 (3d Cir. 1953).
25ld. at 501.
20 15 F. R. D. 200 (M. D. Pa. 1953); 19 Federal Rules Service, Cases, Case 2, 4 f. 22,
December 30, 1953.
27Id. at 204 and 4 f. 22-5.
statute violates the guarantees of Procedural Due Process. Hess v. Pawloski,
28
is still uncontroverted law which recognizes that liability rests on the inroads that
the automobile has made on the decision of Pennoyer v. Neff25 for the protection
of the resident injured party.
The sole question is one of statutory construction. What is the precise
meaning and effect of Rule 4 (d) (7)? Did Congress intend to provide indi-
rectly for a nationwide service of process in diversity of citizenship cases where a
state statute provides for extraterritorial service?30
There is no doubt that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding service
should be construed liberally to effectuate service, if actual notice of suit has been
received by the defendant.1 Furthermore, it is evident that Congress has the
power to authorize the commencement of any action under federal law in any
Federal District Court and to provide that process may run into any part of the
United States, but it has not done so by general law. 2  Historically, original
process of the United States District Courts has always been limited to the boundary
of the state in diversity of citizenship cases. 3
The argument has been made on Rule 82 to the effect that: "These rules
shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States
District Courts . . . ," is a general limitation on extraterritorial jurisdiction. How-
ever, the United States Supreme Court in Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Mur-
phree,34 held that Rule 82 must be construed to refer to venue and subject-matter
jurisdiction of the District Courts "rather than the means of bringing the defendant
before the Court already having venue and jurisdiction of the subject matter."
Clearly, if the collision occurred in the federal district wherein all of the plaintiffs
reside, the Court would have jurisdiction of the subject matter and proper venue.
Service of process, however, is the procedure by which the court may obtain juris-
diction over the person of the defendant so the defendant may be brought into
court only at the place where Congress has declared the suit may be maintained.
To this extent, the question of place of trial and service of process are in reality
quite distinct.
28 Note 3 supra.
2975 U. S. 714 (1878).
30The significance of these questions is not limited to non-resident motorist statutes
but could conceivably extend to situations where state statutes authorize in personam juris-
diction where a domiciliary flees the state to avoid service of process, Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U. S. 457 (1940); where a former resident allegedly caused a collision while in the
state, Allen v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 259 P. 2d 905 (Cal. 1953); where tenants
or users of real estate cause injury to property while in the state, Dubin v. City of Philadel-
phia, 34 Pa. D. & C. 61 (1953); and generally to all instances of constructive service
(service by publication) in the absence of an appropriate federal statute on point. Cf.
4 Catholic U. L. Rev. 62 (1954).
31 Fakouri v. Cadais, 147 F. 2d 667 (5th Cir. 1945); Pierkowskie v. N. Y. Life Ins.
Co., 147 F. 2d 928 (3d Cir. 1944); Rovinski v. Rowe, 131 F. 2d 687 (6th Cir. 1942).
32 Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, note 8 supra at 442 and cases cited
therein; Rorick v. Devon Syndicate Ltd., 307 U. S. 299 (1939).
8s Cf. Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U. S. 619, 622 (1924) and cases cited
therein.
-3 Note 8 supra at 444-445.
Leading authorities; on the Federal Rules have thought that Rule 4 (d) (7)
provides for extraterritorial service of process. District Judge Alexander Holtzoff
in his book on the "New Rules" states that Rule 4 (d) (7) applies specifically to
motorist statutes;"5 a view which is reiterated in his commentary on Federal Prac-
tice and Procedure.3" Professor Moore in his series, Federal Practice,7 takes a
like stand, however, his emphasis is based on the little disputed phase of Due
Process. It is significant to note that the published authorities have spent little
or no time construing Rule 4 (d) (7) so as to ascertain congressional intent
which after all is the sine qua non.
In like manner, the majority of lower federal court decisions have rather
cursorily construed Rule 4 (d) (7) to sanction extraterritorial service of
process in conjunction with state motorist statutes.38 The better reasoned decisions,
35 Holtzoff, New Federal Rules and the Courts, published by the A. B. A., Chicago
(1940).
36 1 Barron & Holtzoff, note 9 supra at § 184, pp. 336-345.
s 2 Moores Federal Practice, note 9 supra at §§ 4.16 and 4.18, pp. 937-941 and 942-
949.
8 O'Toole v. U. S., 106 F. Supp. 804, 809 n. 6 (D. Del. 1952) but invalid as to a
municipal corporation; Kirksey v. Beauchesne et al., 98 F. Supp. 149 (D. Mass. 1951); Roth
v. W. T. Cowan Inc., 97 F. Supp. 675 (E. D. N. Y. 1951) concerning third party practice;
Kostamo v. Brorby at al., 95 F. Supp. 806 (D. Neb. 1951),; Weisler v. Matta et al., 95 F.
Supp. 152 (W. D. Pa. 1951) concerning third party practice; Thurman at al. v. Consolidated
School Dist. at al., 94 F. Supp. 616 (D. Kan. 1950); Morris v. Sun Oil Co. at al., 88 F. Supp.
529 (D. Md. 1950); Mackie v. Rankin at 4l,, 87 F. Supp. 614 (E. D. Mich. 1949); Lule-
vitch v. Hill, 82 F. Supp. 612 (E. D. Pa. 1949) even over a Canadian; Magelssen v. Hale,
81 F. Supp. 138 (W. D. Mo. 1948); Krueger v. Hider, 48 F. Supp. 708 (E. D. S. Car.
1943); Malkins v. Arundel Corp. at al., 36 F. Supp. 948 (D. Md. 1941;) Sussan v. Strasser
et al., 36 F. Supp. 266 (E. D. Pa. 1941) as between federal districts in the same state on
a third party defendant; Zavis at al. v. Warren, 35 F. Supp. 689 (E. D. Wis. 1940); Wil-
liams v. James at al., note 17 supra; Doggett v. Peek at 4., 32 F. Supp. 889 (N. D. Tex.
1940) where service of process on agent of non-resident partners was held valid; Peeples v.
Raipacher, 29 F. Supp. 633 (E. D. S. Car. 1939) a questionable decision on removal;
Devier v. Gao. Cole Motor Co., 27 F. Supp. 978 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Clancy v. Balacier,
27 F. Supp. 867 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Iser v. Brockway, 25 F. Supp. 221 (W. D. Pa. 1938);
Giflen v. Ensign, note 24 supra; Mendenhall v. Texas Co. at al., 15 F. R. D. 193 (W. D.
Pa. 1953) concerning third party practice; Setterlund v. Spierer at al., 11 F. D. R. 601'
(S. D. Mo. 1951); Townsend v. Fletcher at al., 9 F. R. D. 711 (N. D. Ohio 1949); Martin
v. Fischbach Trucking Co., 9 F. R. D. 602 (D. Mass. 1949); Ball at al. v. Yankee Lines at al,
Co., 9 F. R. D. 590 (W D Pa 1950); Buttson at l. v. Arnold, 4 F. R. D. 492 (E. D. Pa.
General Ins. Corp. at al., note 17 supra. CONTRA: McCoy v. Silver, note 22 supra at 501;
Hartley v. Utah Const. Co., 106 F. 2d 953 (9th Cir. 1939) retroactive effect not given;
Arndt v. Mitchell Cadillac Rental Inc. at al., 115 F. Supp. 533 (D. N. J. 1953) to the
effect that Rule 4 (d) (7) must be strictly construed because in derogation of the Common
Law; Camden v. Harris, 109 F. Supp. 311 (W. D. Ark. 1953) holding that a U. S.
military reservation is not a public highway; McDaniel v. Drotman, 103 F. Supp. 643 (W. D.
Ky. 1952); Glenn v. Holub, 36 F. Supp. 941 (S. D. Iowa 1941) holding for necessity that
the state statute must provide for reasonable, actual notice to the defendant; Halliday v.
Burlington Transp. Co., 36 F. Supp. 108 (W. D. Mo. 1940) held invalid notice to the
defendant; Hendrick v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 28 F. Supp. 257 (S. D. Ohio 1939); Angelone
v. Monahan, 9 F. R. D. 313 (D. R. I. 1949); Barnhart at 4l. v. John Rogers Producing
Co., 9 F. R. D. 590 (W. D. Pa. 1950); Buttson at al. v. Arnold, 4 F. R. D. 492 (E. D. Pa.
1945) to the effect that the state agency terminated with the death of the non-resident
motorist; Niemiec v. Interstate Motor Freight System at al., 2 F. R. D. 408 (W. D. Mich.
1942); Whitmire v. Partin at al., 2 F. R. D. 83 (E. D. Tenn. 1941); O'Brien at al. v.
Richtarsic, 2 F. R. D. 42 (W. D. N. Y. 1941) and cases cited therein concerning third
party practice and ancillary jurisdiction.
however, hold that Rule 4 (d) (7) "presupposes jurisdiction of the party served,"
and Rule 4 (f) controls, is an indispensable or necessary party actually be outside
the territorial limits of the state. 9
Statutory construction demands that Rule 4 (d) (7) be read in pari materia
with Rule 4 (f). Rule 4 (f) restricts all service with the exception of the sub-
poena and a specific United States statute to the "territorial limits of the state" in
which the United States District Court sits. Is this Rule merely a "savings clause"
or an "exception"? Obviously not. Rule 4 (f) would have absolutely no meaning
or reason for existence if service of complaint and summons is permitted on an
out-of-state motorist in a diversity of citizenship action.
An interpretation of Rule 4 (d) (7) itself: ". . . or in the manner prescribed
by the law of the state in which the service is made . . . ," indicates that the Rule
would have no extraterritorial effect of in personam jurisdiction. The United
States Supreme Court held in Wuchter v. Pizzutti" that mere service of the appro-
priate state official without notification by registered mail to the defendant at his
out-of-town address, violates adjective Due Process. Service of process, therefore,
is not "made" or completely "made" until it reaches the non-resident motorist
outside the territorial limits of the state. Then, the state "in which service is made"
is actually the foreign jurisdiction of the non-resident motorist. All of which is
precluded by the very wording of Rule 4 (d) (7) itself.!1
In ascertaining the meaning of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
construction given to them by the Advisory Committee to the Supreme Court "is
of weight."42  As a matter of practice, this Court has relied heavily on the legis-
lative and administrative interpretations of acts, rules and orders and has deemed
them controlling in voluminous cases in the last two decades. 3
There is no specific annotation to Rule 4 (d) (7) by the Advisory Committee
and the Supreme Court has never construed the extent of the Rule itself. How-
ever, in the proceedings of the Institutes and Symposiums which considered the
"New Rules", Rule 4 (d) (7) was frequently discussed and commented upon by
members of the Committee. Although the Rule has been characterized as "a kind
of a catch-all,""4 it is clear that the members of the Advisory Committee did not
"think [they] could change any matter of jurisdiction."45  As to persons outside
89McCoy v. Silver, note 24 supra at 501; McDaniel v. Drotman, note 38 supra;
Angelone v. Monahan, note 38 supra; O'Brien et al. v. Ricbtarsic, note 38 supra concerning
third party practice.
40276 U. S. 13 (1928).
41 A similar line of reasoning was employed in Angelone v. Monahan, note 38 supra
at 314.
42 Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, note 8 supra at 444. But in Wieland v.
Son Daisy Co., 4 F. R. D. 250 (D. Wis. 1945), the court held that the construction of the
Advisory Committee "while persuasive, cannot be accepted as authority."
43 Cf. Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Estate of Church, 335 U. S. 632, 687 (1948).
44Cf. Response of Circuit Judge Charles E. Clark, member of the Advisory Com-
mittee, Proceedings of the Institute at Cleveland, note 9 supra at 205.
46Id. at 212.
the jurisdiction of the court, the plaintiff must rely on the "limited extent of
federal legislation" with regard to extraterritorial service of process."
When you are making service outside the state, you proceed according to the
United States statutes or these rules. See Rule 4 (e). The provision in this
paragraph (7) that a summons may be served in the manner prescribed by
the law of the state means personal service of the summons within the state. 47
Finally, it is pertinent to inquire into the power of the United States District
Courts to acquire in personam jurisdiction. Would substituted service of process
on a non-resident motorist "abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive rights of
any litigant?" This is the general limitation to the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure established by Congress in the Enabling Act.
48 I
In ascertaining exactly what constituted impairment of "substantive rights"
under Rule 4 (f), the United States Supreme Court decided that service of process
from one federal district to another district in the same state was "a slight incon-
venience" but not so substantive as to come within the prohibitions of the
Enabling Act. In regard to service of process under Rule 4 (d) (7) in con-
junction with a state motorist statute, the non-resident defendant might well be
required to travel hundreds of miles to defend. While each case of necessity must
be decided on its own facts, such extraterritorial service of process certainly would
constitute more than "a slight inconvenience" and would not be inconsistent with
the spirit of the Rules to the effect that "they shall be construed to secure a just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
49
The mere fact that the non-resident motorist may be forced under the Police
Power of a state to defend in that state, and that he may demand immediate re-
moval of the case to the federal court, does not diminish the reality that under the
Gifien v. Ensigns ° facts, it was not the state Police Power alone which brought the
defendant before the federal court but the power of the federal court itself which is
subject to the "substantive rights" limitation of the Enabling Act and even to the
doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens.1 To this extent, this doctrine and the gen-
eral limitation of the Enabling Act are complementary, if not analogous.
This, then, is a picture of the law on motorist statutes and federal jurisdiction
as it exists at this writing. As it is presently constituted, Rule 4 (d) (7) may
enlarge the limits of service of process within the state, however, it alone does not
vest extraterritorial jurisdiction in the United States District Courts.
48 Comment of Major Tolman, Proceedings of the Institute at Washington and Sym-
posium at New York City, note 10 supra at 114. Also Cf. Id. at 294 and 298.
47 Response of Hon. George Donworth, former United States District Judge and mem-
ber of the Advisory Committee, Symposium at New York City, note 10 supra at 289.
48 "Said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any
litigant . ..," Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, note 7 supra.
40 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U. S. C. Rule 1 as amended (1948).
50 Note 26 supra.
81 Cf. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501 (1947) and with specific reference
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Angus v. Younger Bros., 49 F. Supp. 449 (W. D.
La. 1943). The Doctrine is uniquely applicable in motorist cases, since the state courts have
complete jurisdiction to adjudicate these tort cases for all defendants.
Proposed Amendments
In May, 1954, six years after the last general revision, the Advisory Com-
mittee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure published proposed amendments
affecting twenty-seven rules, two of which were Rules 4 (e) and 4 (f). The
amendment to Rule 4 (e) is designed to remove present confusion regarding
substituted service and quasi in rem jurisdiction in diversity cases by permitting
suits in conformity with state practice and available local remedies.
(e) SAME: OTHER SERVICE. Whenever a statute of the United States or
any of these rules or an order of court provides for service of a summons, or
of notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant
of or found within the state, service shall be made under the circumstances and
in the manner prescribed by the statute, rule, or order. Whenever a statute or
rule of court of the state in which the district court is held provides for service
of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon a party
not an inhabitant of or found within the state, or for notice to such a party
to appear and respond or defend in an action by reason of the attachment or
garnishment of his property located within the state, it shall also be sufficient
if service is made or the party is brought before the court under the circum-
stances and in the manner prescribed in the state statute or rule.52
Alternative proposals for amendment of Rule 4 (f) were presented by the
Committee for the recommendations of the legal profession. The first amendment
permits extraterritorial service of process outside the state at any point within 100
miles of the courthouse where the district court sits as provided by law." Thus,
the territorial limits of service of all process conform to that which has heretofore
prevailed with regard to service of a subpoena.
(f) TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF EFFECTIVE SERVICE. [All process other than
a subpoena may be served anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in
which the district court is held and at all places without the district that are
within 100 miles of the place or places designated by law for the holding of
the district court and, when a statute of the United States so provides (be-
yond) within the territorial limits (of that state) provided in such statute.]
A subpoena may be served within the territorial limits provided in Rule 45.54
The more limited second alternative authorizes service on any party within
the state and service within 100 miles of the place where the existing action is to
be tried to bring in an additional defendant to a counterclaim, Rule 13 (h), to add
a third-party defendant, Rule 14, to join an indispensable party without whose
joinder the existing action must be dismissed, Rule 19, or to enforce the court's
decrees in order that an entire controversy may be determined in one lawsuit.
(f) TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF EFFECTIVE SERVICE. [All process other than
a subpoena may be served anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in
which the district court is held and, when a statute of the United States so
provides, beyond the territorial limits of that state. Process other than a sub-
poena may be served upon persons who are made parties pursuant to Rule
13 (b) or Rule 14, or who are indispensable parties to an existing action, or
who are required to respond in proceedings for the enforcement of the court's
52 Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments, note 23 supra at 1. New matter is
shown in italics.
5 Cf. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, 28 U. S. C. § § 81-131 (1948).
54 Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments, note 23 supra at 1-2. New matter is
shown in italics; matter to be omitted is in parenthesis.
orders and judgments, within the limits thus stated and at all places without
the district that are within 100 miles of the place where the action is to be or
has been tried.] A subpoena may be served within the territorial limits pro-
vided in Rule 45.55
The Advisory Committee itself is not committed to the adoption of any of
these proposals. On the contrary, the members of the Committee are "divided in
opinion." Furthermore, the draft has not been approved by the Supreme Court
or the Congress. Indeed, neither of these bodies has even considered it.
Doubtless, amendment is necessary, especially to allay the confusion sur-
rounding the rules controlling service of process. Unfortunately, the manner in
which the proposals have been drafted leaves much to be desired. As applied to
non-resident motorist statutes, the amendments to Rules 4 (e) and 4 (f) leave
questions of duplicity, ambiguity and sheer lack of power.
It is inconceivable to the author why the amendment to allow service in con-
formity with state procedure was tacked on to Rule 4 (e). The words merely
duplicate the provisions of Rule 4 (d) (7) in more explicit terms. True, Rule
4 (e) as amended permits original jurisdiction through quasi in rem attachment
and garnishment as distinguished from Rule 64 which presently authorizes such
seizure only for the purpose of securing satisfaction of judgment." All of this,
however, leaves us with a completely hopeless Rule 4 (d) (7). Of what effect
or purpose would Rule 4 (d) (7) be?61 This in turn leads to the consideration
of ambiguity which results from the tenuous relation of Rules 4 (d) (7) and 4 (e)
as amended to the territorial limitation of Rule 4 (f).
The primary thing that has plagued lower court decisions and commentators
on the Federal Rules is the question whether or not Rule 4 (f) is merely a
"savings clause" or an "exception", particularly in regard to the utilization of state
procedure in conjunction with Rule 4 (d) (7). The matter now would be further
complicated by two Rules, both 4 (d) (7) and 4 (e) as amended. Are these
rules restricted by the territorial limits of the state or within 100 miles of the state,
or can a party be served by substituted process created by a motorist or quasi in rem
statute even though he resides hundreds or thousands of miles from the district
courthouse? The same problem remains whether these rules in fact or by implica-
tion allow nation-wide service of process. This is the dilemma faced in Giffen v.
Ensign's which indeed, as applied to Ensign, would be reversed if either the
55 Id. at 2. New matter is shown in italics.
56 Concerning the substituted service authorized by motorist statutes, there is no prop-
erty or proprietary interest upon which jurisdiction may be predicated but only upon the
legal fiction of "implied consent" induced from the defendant's use of a state highway.
The wording of Rule 4 (e) as amended, however, is broad enough to include this form
of substituted service. Furthermore, Rule 64 is specifically subject to the territorial limita-
tions of Rue 4 (f). Such limitation is not set forth in the proposed amendment to Rule
4 (e). Rule 71A (d) (3) (ii) is one which expressly provides that the Rule is not
subject to Rule 4 (f), however, this unfettered service may be justified because of the
independent eminent domain power. Cf. Note of the Advisory Committee to Rule 71,
Federal Court Rules Annotated, note 10 supra at 562 and 564.
57 Cf. note 65 in!ra.
58 Cf. note 26 supra and other decisions therein involving both original and third
party defendants.
present or amended version of Rule 4 (f) deemed controlling by the court. If
taken alone, however, the amended provision of Rule 4 (e), if anything, lends
support to the Giffen decision.
In the last analysis, the real crux of the question is the power of the United
States District Courts to so extend the limits and scope of service of process. It is
extremely difficult to discuss naked power with the enigma of duplicity and
ambiguity hanging unresolved, however, an attempt will be made to do so.
The note of the Advisory Committee to the amended Rule 4 (f) concludes
that "the court's power in the premises is settled by Mississippi Pub. Corp. v.
Murphree."9 This is simply not true. At best, it is open to question. True, the
MUrphree case does stand for the well-established proposition that Congress has
the power to authorize nation-wide service of process in diversity cases. It must
be constantly remembered, however, that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
originally and as amended, are subject to the very general limitation imposed by
the Congress itself, to wit, that "Said Rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor
modify the substantive rights of any litigant. . . .o This limitation was also
considered in the Murphree case. In this regard, the Supreme Court held that
service of process from one federal district to another district in the same state
was "a slight inconvenience" but not so substantive so as to come within the pro-
hibitions of the Enabling Act. At what point would an extension of service
"modify substantive rights?"
If either Rule 4 (d) (7) or Rule 4 (e) as amended is construed to stand
alone and, therefore, to authorize unlimited extraterritorial substituted service
when supported by appropriate state procedure, then certainly there would be a
modification of the substantive rights traditionally enjoyed by litigants in federal
diversity cases.61  If Rules 4 (d) (7) and 4 (e) as amended are subject to the
lerritorial limitation of Rule 4 (f), whether or not the 100 mile extension con-
templated in the amendment is "substantive" presents an extremely difficult
consideration.
The Advisory Committee has drawn the analogy between the 100 mile ex-
tension and that territorial limitation which has always existed in regard to the
subpoena. The analogy limps. If a witness is subpoenaed, he need only bring
himself, or if duces tecum his papers, records, etc., which are usually readily acces-
sible at least to himself. He has no interest in the outcome of the litigation but
only in the largely mechanical function of presenting himself and telling the
whole truth. On the other hand, the indispensable litigant, originally impleaded"2
5 Note of the Advisory Committee to the proposed Rule 4 (f), Preliminary Draft
of Proposed Amendments, note 23 supra at 6.
60Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, 28 U. S. C. § 2072 as amended (1949), note 7
supra.
61 In this manner, Congress unwittingly may allow federal diversity jurisdiction to be
tremendously increased, especially since these proposals become effective automatically three
months after they are transmitted to Congress or on August 1, 1955. Cf. Rule 86, EFFEC-
TIVE DATE, and the Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments, note 23 supra at 57.
62 If these extensions of service "modify the substantive rights" of original parties,
or subjected to a counterclaim, 3 must not only consider himself and the physical
evidence at his command but must arrange for an attorney in the foreign jurisdic-
tion to plead his cause. Then, he must summon witnesses and their records, etc.,
which well may involve a complicated discovery practice. All of this done by
remote control of 100 or more miles.
Indeed, it may be answered that defendants are subjected to the above pro-
cedure every day in Hess v. Pawloski cases in state courts. This is quite true.
However, it is equally true that this procedure would be a radical departure in
federal diversity cases. There is no general United States statute authorizing sub-
stituted service in diversity cases per se. Limited federal jurisdiction is not the
exception but the established rule. This Pandora's Box opened by skillful drafting
techniques should be approached with extreme caution lest traditional rights be
inched or "miled" away.
As has been observed, the injured motorist plaintiff is assured of at least three
distinct courts which will adjudicate his cause, specifically, the federal and state
courts sitting at the domicile of the non-resident and the state courts of the juris-
diction wherein the collision occurred. There is no justification for allowing this
plaintiff to sit at home at still a fourth forum. To sanction this indulgence mani-
festly would "enlarge" the rights of the plaintiff and at the very least "modify" the
rights of the defendant, original or not.
Moreover, there can be no intimation that the plaintiff will not secure a "just,
speedy and inexpensive" determination of his cause in the state jurisdiction in
which he is a resident. This is true in view of the fact that the federal courts are
bound to apply the substantive tort law of the state in their decisions under the
ruling of Erie Ry. v. Tompkins.64 The very effect of this epic case was to rid the
federal courts of the administrative difficulties which result when litigation is piled
up in tort cases of the diversity of citizenship class.
While the author is not wholly persuaded that these extensions of service of
process are prudent, he is cognizant that it is quite easy to criticize without offering
a constructive alternative. Therefore, the following is proposed to resolve the
duplicitous and ambiguous nature of this inquiry as well as to remove doubts
concerning the power of the United States District Courts. An entirely new draft-
ing technique should be employed which would repeal and abolish Rules 4 (d)
(7), 4 (e) and 4 (f) altogether. In their place, one comprehensive "Rule 4 (e)"
a fortiori they would also "modify" the rights of additional parties who necessarily have
comparable interest in the litigation. An impleaded defendant to a motorist case is usually
considered ancillary and would not oust federal diversity jurisdiction unless the plaintiff
amends his pleadings to include counts or other claims against the third party defendant.
Even then, there appears to be no reason for allowing this extension, since a state action
may be instituted for contribution from the joint tortfeasor.
63 Again, even if a compulsory counterclaim is precluded in the federal courts because
the party was not served in the original action, recovery may be had in an action in a state
court.
64304 U. S. 64 (1938).
should be inserted utilizing the best of the present rules and proposals. The
revised "Rule" might read in the following manner.
(e) TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF EFFECTIVE SERVICE. All process other than a
subpoena may be served anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in
which the district court is held and at all places without the district that are
within 100 miles of the place or places designated by law for the holding of
the district court and beyond the territorial limits of that state as provided in
the following subdivisions to this Rule.
(1) A subpoena may be served within the territorial limits provided in
Rule 45.
(2) Whenever a statute of the United States or any of these rules or an
order of court provides for service of summons, or of notice, or of an order in
lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the
state, service shall be made under the circumstances and in the manner pre-
scribed by the statute, rule, or order.
(3) Whenever a statute or rule of court of the state in which the district
court is held provides for service of summons, or of a notice, or of an order
in lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the
state, or for notice to such a party to appear and respond or defend in an
action by reason of the attachment or garnishment of his property located
within the state, or for notice to a party residing or incorporated or doing
business within the state, it shall also be sufficient if service is made or the party
is brought into court under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed
in the state statute or rule applicable in an action brought in the courts of
general jurisdiction of that state.65
The last wrinkle remaining to be ironed out is the Enabling Act of 1934,
now incorporated into the Judiciary Act of 1948.66 As has been previously indi-
cated, it is questionable if the 100 mile extension in the main clause of the revised
"Rule 4 (e)" above and the scope of subsection (2) and (3) would stand attack
under the "modification of substantive rights" limitation of the Act. Moreover,
an attempt to increase federal jurisdiction by the indirection of ambiguous rules
should be denounced. Abolition or modification of the pertinent clause in 28
U. S. C. § 2072 is the only answer. An endeavor must be made to convince the
Congress that sixteen years of practical experience under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure warrants these extensions of service to allow greater federal juris-
diction. Any other approach would only turn confusion into chaos.
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66 This "Rule" spells out every phase of service. To argue that Subsection (3) is too
broad, to deny that the language of the present rules and proposed amendments couched in
their ambiguous terms proport to do what here is set forth, would only be burying one's
head in the sand of deception. It will be noticed that Rule 4 (d) (7) has been omitted.
To include it would be duplicitious. Subsection (2) and (3) cover all possibilities for
reaching a party not an inhabitant or found within the state, including United States
statutes, state procedure, orders of court and the federal rules themselves. In addition, the
state procedure authorized in Subsection (3) augments Rule 4 (d) (1) pertaining to
service of residents and Rule 4 (d) (3) pertaining to service of business entities.
66 Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, 28 U. S. C. § 2072 as amended (1949), note 7
supr'a.
